Operation Mundingburra”


I don’t personally remember what day July 23, 1969 was – individual weekdays were of no importance to a soldier’s routine then. I do remember however it was only a few days after the first moon landing (caught that news on Armed Forces Radio) and also it was a few days after we witnessed hundreds of tonnes of bombs that fell noiselessly from an empty azure blue sky, to completely pulverise a small local mountain range called ‘The Long Hais’.

On July 23rd 1969, the NZ Army suffered – in a single combat action – one of the worst (if not the worst), single total loss of life and personal injury ever inflicted on any NZ Combat Unit since World War II. (Military historians will be quick to correct me if I am way out here)

As was appropriate to those times, this action hardly ran to more than several paragraphs in most of the major daily papers at the time and apart from the immediate families concerned, the incident failed to rate in any media past a two day period. In this present, hectic and volatile ‘political-era’, amid frantic scrambling for ‘Brownie Points’ from the NZ voter, it is quite conceivable to believe that a similar occurrence nowadays, would create a media frenzy that would be stretched out for some considerable length and depth.

Both times and political climates have most definitely changed!

The incident that I am referring to occurred almost two weeks into ‘Operation Mundingburra’ – a month long operation by the 6RAR/ANZAC Battalion to introduce the American ‘Phrase of the Week’ – the pacification portion of the ‘Hearts & Minds’ project. A conception that some obviously deranged minds from within both the US Military and Political scene had likely devised on a white board, in some obscure side office of the Pentagon. (Probably enough said on this subject).

As a direct consequence the ANZAC Battalion (which included both W2 and V4 Rifle Companies of the Royal NZ Infantry Regiment), was dispersed to cover a series of towns and small hamlets from Dat Do south to the coast. Their objectives were three-fold. Their requirement was:

to disrupt enemy infiltration into the villages by a co-ordinated system of patrolling and ambushing

maintain regular checkpoints on the main access routes between the villages – to ensure individuals travelled with their appropriate ID cards etc, and on a more personal note ….

disperse into smaller units (rifle sections of 10 -12 men) to the lower-occupied hamlets, where our medical personnel could offer basic medicines and assistance to those villagers who might need it That is, to attempt to win over the local villagers’ trust and perhaps friendship (Hearts and Minds!)

To quote a popular colloquial NZ billboard, “Yeah – Right”

Had those intellectual planners given any thought whatsoever that, not only were we perceived as ‘the invaders’ to the locals, we were about as compatible to the average Vietnamese peasant as a Hamas Palestinian is to a right-wing Jew.

2 Platoon, W2 Company, at this time were hoochied up just outside the tiny hamlet of Ap Lo Gom (population was listed as 512 but I think they must have included the pigs and buffalo). We would spend our days alternating the three rifle sections from checkpoint duty on the nearby road, to escorting medics into the hamlet (encouraging medical parades of the civilian population), to active and aggressive day patrols around the perimeter of the hamlet. Incorporated in this routine were nightly ambushes along suspected infiltration routes.

For five days from the commencement of the operation, the ANZAC Battalion was having minor successes throughout the entire southern area – numerous contacts resulted in over a dozen enemy killed and a steady supply of food and ammunition caches recovered.
However the reality of how much different this aspect of warfare was from what 6RAR had experienced with so much glory earlier in 1966 – with the now renowned “Battle of Long Tan” – was abruptly and very rudely brought home to the diggers of A Company on July 21st. Whilst patrolling, one of their platoons triggered an M16 anti-personnel mine explosion that initially killed one digger and wounded a further 18. A short time later, that same day, during the medical evacuation of the original wounded, a second mine was exploded killing one more ANZAC soldier, as well as injuring an additional 6. Two split second moments of mayhem, no warning and no confrontation with an enemy, yet a casualty list of 2 KIA (Killed In Action) and 24 WIA (Wounded In Action).

The mine warfare that we had been warned about for some time was really upon us. The harsh reality was there was very little we could do to recover the immediate initiative. Aside from the impractical solution of slowly sweeping every inch of ground ahead and to the side of you whilst patrolling, there was little else to do but maintain our vigilance. As experienced and professional soldiers, we were expected to accept the situation, adjust what tactics we thought practical and carry on normal patrols (albeit with wider eyes and a little extra precaution). For example, most rifle sections on day patrols included in their group a specialist radio operator and an Assault Pioneer with a mine detector. Having an AP with us on our patrols was a constant reminder of the potential hidden dangers.

Which brings me to July 23rd. 2 Platoon’s 2nd Section, led by Corporal Joe Radford, drew the short straw that day for the daytime perimeter patrol – around (mostly) the open countryside to the south and west of Ap Lo Gom. It was in this area that several large tracks headed out from the hamlet, across the sun baked and dried out padi fields and on further to the distant Long Hai ranges – a known refuge for several Viet Cong Units. The 2 Platoon’s radio operator, Dave Jackson, as well as a Kiwi Assault Pioneer – Pte ‘Meeces’ Peat, reinforced our 2nd Rifle Section.

On this day, our task was to check if there were fresh sign present along any of the tracks and in addition we were to quickly scan through the perimeter area of an ambush site that we had occupied the previous night. It was common practice for the Viet Cong to return to any abandoned Allied positions and scavenge for discarded food rations.

Having reached the earlier ambush site, Joe gave the order for an all around defence, with a 10 minute break for a drink etc whilst he himself checked out our previously occupied area.

Being in the rear half of the patrol, I was still moving forward to occupy the ’12 o’clock’ position of the temporary harbour (I was carrying the M79 Grenade Launcher and had a clear line of fire right to the main road). The front portion of our patrol, including Scout, M60 Gunner and mate, were already scattered in a semi-circle, sitting down facing outwards – approximately 20 to 30 feet from me. Joe appeared from out of the low scrub to my right and called my name as I walked past. Simultaneously as I turned to him to check his query, Joe initiated the M16 blast – a distance of less than eight feet from where I had paused.

The entire time that we had been in the area of the hamlet, we had encountered absolutely no sign of enemy activity. No contacts, no tracks and no indication from the local population as to any recent enemy presence. However due to the mine incidents two days prior, we were extremely alert. Yet the sudden and totally unexpected deadliness of the explosion and the subsequent devastating aftermath epitomised how the Vietnam War had degenerated into such a horrific distrust between enemy, civilians and allies alike.

Later investigation by task Force intelligence discovered that the mines were laid by the villagers and residents of Ap Lo Gom – the very same villagers that we were supposedly ‘winning over’.

In that split second of the explosion, the subsequent deaths of three Kiwi soldiers and the seriously wounding of a further three, decimated the Rifle Section of 11 to 12 men. Close friends and companions reduced instantaneously to improbable lifeless mounds of flesh and scorched uniforms. Joe Radford died immediately, Ray Hawthorne and Terry (Pinetree) Hollows some days later of multiple wounds. ‘Meeces’ Peat suffered a severe shrapnel wound to the abdomen, however gallantly regained his feet and successfully cleared paths to the dead and wounded with his Mine Detector. Meeces was later deservedly awarded the Military Medal for this unselfish act.

Myself and Pat Harrison, the other two casualties of the patrol, were air-medevacced to different allied field hospitals and finally reunited at Papakura Military camp almost 12 months later. It appears that I was the lucky one of us two – I only had four months hospitalisation during my recuperation and retained all of limbs.

Tragically, W2 Company was to suffer yet again. On 12th August, barely three weeks later in the operation, Sapper ‘Raff’ Brown was killed instantly whilst clearing mines from an area surrounding the school building at Phuoc Loi. Three other NZ soldiers were wounded and one of those – Pte ‘Stretch’ Bermingham was to later die from his wounds.

Footnote #1 (April 2006) – Some Interesting Facts Following The Completion of “Operation Mundingburra” on 15 August 1969:


Duration of Operation 31 days
Total ANZACS KIA (Killed In Action) 11 (including 6 Kiwis)
Total ANZACS WIA (Wounded In Action) 54
Total Enemy KIA (Confirmed body count) 22
Estimated Enemy Wounded 4
Enemy POWs Captured 2
M16 Mines Detonated 169
M26 (Grenade) Booby Traps Located 176
60mm Mortar Booby Traps Located 24
Misc. Booby Traps Located 6


During “Operation Mundingburra” a mine casualty study was conducted (at the request of the Commander of the Australian Force Vietnam), by his personal ‘Science Advisor’ – Mr GF Cawsey. His final conclusions to the Commander were:

“The troops deployed in the pacification operation came up against a very substantially different operational situation from those experienced before. By the end of the twelve week period examined, the mine battle had been won, the ability to find mines and deal with them at a relatively low risk had been demonstrated and the pacification programme had developed enormously with marked success. It seems to me quite likely that these particular operations were among the most successful 1ATF has conducted and certainly at this stage of the war they are of major importance. Although the overall cost to the enemy in recovery, storage, protection and placing the mines is not known, the immediate cost would seem to be very slight. It was probably, for them, highly cost-effective until this battle was lost.”

I think the good old ‘Local Billboard’ should (again) have the last say as a typical Kiwi response to this ‘load’ – “Yeah, Right!”





(RIP Joe, Terry, Ray (23/07/69), Raff and Stretch (12/08/69). From your mates of W2 ANZAC Btn – Our ongoing thoughts, sympathy and support for your families)







Footnote #2 (July 2009) – Thoughts and Ponderings Three Years On.

Further to my original account of “Operation Mundingburra”, I have since read and reluctantly digested a very detailed and thought-provoking book by an Australian Military Historian, Mr Greg Lockhart. His official historic and personal account of the background history of both the minefield itself as well as the people directly involved – ANZAC soldiers, Viet Cong, NVA and civilians, is a truly shocking testament to the inadequacies and influences of a small few that so widely and tragically affected so many. The book is entitled “The Minefield: An Australian Tragedy In Vietnam” and was first published in 2007.

Mr Lockhart’s has clinically linked relevant historical background with shocking facts, decisions and outright criminal blunders made on a constant basis by various allied high command figures. For anyone who has had personal knowledge of this area of Phouc Tuoy and the disasters that followed, it is a very, very, hard book to accept. It took me many attempts to complete and buckets of tears. For all of that though, it definitely was a book that needed to be told – made even more so by varying accounts from Viet Cong Veterans on their thoughts of these times.

One example, Greg reports, is that prior to the above ‘Operation Mundingburra’, 9RAR was the first Battalion to sent into the ‘mine warfare’ region between 8 May to 15 June 1969 (‘Operation Reynella’) – their total losses from the 5 week operation to mines and booby traps – 6 ANZACs KIA & 26 wounded.

9RAR was next replaced (in the same region) by 5RAR in ‘Operation Esso’ – from 15 June to 15 July 1969. 5RAR’s casualties in those 4 weeks – 11 KIA & 46 WIA. Added to those total casualties from 6RAR/ANZAC in the following 5 weeks and our Doctors, nurses and medical orderlies, over a relatively short period of 14 weeks (barely three months) were faced with a casualty count of over 28 ANZAC soldiers killed and a shocking figure of 126 wounded – most of those seriously. In addition, these figures have not included the casualties from the civilian population, the ARVN (Army of Republic of Vietnam), any of the other allied forces in the area and not even the numerous enemy wounded that were treated within the same facilities.

One of my more lasting memories of that particular day and those that immediately followed, was the dedication, sheer professionalism and genuine care that was showered on us by all of the Armed Forces medical staff. From helicopters pilots daring landings in potentially mined areas uplifting the seriously wounded, to their cheerful and efficient crews, the speedy handling by hospital orderlies at the hospital landing pads and the quietly gentle, assuring manner of all of the medical staff. Theirs is truly another story altogether. (Note: Try “Tears On My Pillow – Australian Nurses in Vietnam” by Narelle Biedermann. Any wounded Kiwi Vets are sure to recognise the narrative as well as the photos). They were all a credit to their profession, their country and most of all to themselves.

On a more positive side, there has been both substantial change as well as stagnation within the NZ Vietnam Veteran community since I wrote the above just prior to ANZAC Day 2006. On the positive side, the high point for me would have to have been Tribute ’08. Having never previously attended any prior reunions (my regrettable personal mistake), Tribute ’08 far surpassed any expectations that I had held. It was very well organised and thought out, very well and sensitively conducted and very well received emotionally by the Veterans, their families and general public. 40 years on, the years rolled magically back and memories, both happy and sad, were shared in floods of tears and huge choruses of laughter.

For those of us from W2, the only regret was that our leader through those most traumatic of times, Lindsay Williams, had tragically died just weeks before the commencement of Tribute .08. However, in his stead, we were both honoured and blessed by the dignity and charm of his wife, Anne, his son Evan and their families. That unique and particularly strong bond that enabled W2 to achieve and endure so much during our overseas posting is, not unsurprisingly, as close as it ever was.

Also, the much debated and maligned MOU has, at the very least, forced a long-overdue review of the NZ War Pensions Act. The hope is that future servicemen and women of the country will be far better served in any health needs that relate directly to their active service. This has yet to be satisfactorily resolved and I know there are more than a few Veterans maintaining keen interest in this outcome.



Evan (Mac) McKenzie – W2 Coy RNZIR (July 2009)

(An edited and updated version of an original essay entitled ‘An ANZAC Reminiscence’ that was forwarded to Kiwi Viet Vets E-Mail net in April 2006)